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Abstract. This work has its interests in the relation 
between the generation mix within a power system and 
the elasticity of demand based on the prices emerging 
from the short term electricity market. The paper starts by 
describing a new agent-based modelling framework that 
involves electricity producers, consumers and suppliers 
as agents participating in a market environment. The 
framework allows for investigating the effect of demand 
elasticities on bidding of generators in the short term 
market and its influence on their revenue in the long 
term. We focus on the increasingly important issue of 
renewable technology such as wind generation and the 
volatility it brings into the electricity market. Specifically 
we investigate three scenarios with varying mix of 
generating technologies such as coal, gas and wind 
turbines and measure the aggregate demand response to 
signals such as the System Buy Prices (SBP) emerging 
out of the balancing market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The evolution of the modern electricity grid into a smart 
and responsive one is dependent on evolution of its 
features such as demand response, supplier participation, 
generator operation and bidding strategies, market 
structures and the like. Participation of demand sites such 
as large commercial consumers, hospitals, schools, 
community of households is becoming imperative for the 
success of demand response programs in new market 
structures. In such a scenario, we need to assess the effect 
of large scale participation of these loads on the generator 
behaviour in the market. The generators are themselves 
active in the short term electricity markets such as power 
exchanges, balancing markets, ancillary services and the 
like. While the response of loads is dependent in some 
way on the prices in such markets and in turn on the 
strategies and technologies employed by the generators, 
conversely the strategies and more importantly the 
technology mix is dependant to an extent on the response 
of these demand sites. Hence the need to assess the 
relation between the generation mix and the response of 
demand via price signals. Demand elasticity then 
becomes a predominant factor in modelling the response 
of demand to price signals from the market. Demand 
elasticity or price elasticity in this context means the 
percentage change in the demand due to a percentage 
change in the price as seen by this demand. The 
objectives of this work therefore are to investigate the 
effective utilization of different generation technologies 
through aggregated demand response of varying 
elasticities, and also to bring to a wider audience an 
Agent Based Modelling (ABM) framework for probing 
such issues. Given the complexity surrounding the 
operation and functioning of a smart grid, ABM 
methodology enables investigation of issues such as the 
above in a dynamic framework. The main contributions 
of this work are to our understanding of the effect of 
price elasticity of demand on the optimal mix of 
generation technologies in a competitive short term 
electricity market. To begin with, we introduce an agent 
based modelling framework incorporating generation and 
aggregated demand models along with a model of the UK 
short term electricity market. We then investigate the 
effect of demand elasticity on the sustainability of an 
optimal mix of generation technologies in a competitive 
electricity market. 
 
The effect of demand response programs as observed 
through feedback of price signals to the consumers has 
been widely observed in various pilot projects [1]. 
Different types of pricing schemes such as Real Time 
Pricing (RTP), Time Of Use pricing (TOU), Critical Peak 
Pricing (CPP) and the like have been experimented in 
these pilot projects and have shown to yield good results 
in varying circumstances. For instance, Sioshansi and 
Short [2] demonstrated the effectiveness of RTP on 
demands of varying elasticities under different scenarios 
of generation mix, predominantly focusing on wind 
power. They showed that constraints on operation of 
conventional power generators could result in wind 
power being under-utilized and that RTP, even with low 
elasticities, could increase both the percentage of load 
served by wind power and the amount of power utilized 
from wind generation in real time. However, their model 
does not take into account all aspects of electricity 
market such as market power and learning schemes to bid 
and offer power in the market. 
 
The processes within a market structure provide the 
participating agents, especially the producers of 
electricity, with opportunities to game the system in order 
to secure a large share of the market at the expense of the 
overall efficiency of the market. Such market power has 
typically been related to lower elasticity of consumer 
demands [3]. Therefore it is imperative to engage 
consumers for achieving increased market efficiency at 
least in the short-term. This could be done by means of 
designing a participatory tariff or price signal that 
engages the consumers especially those who are capable 
of influencing the behaviour of trading entities in the 
balancing or short term electricity markets. The potential 
candidates for such price signals could be the System Sell 
and System Buy Prices that are a result of the balancing 
market. 
 
2. Agent Based Modelling Framework 
 
The framework for probing the issues surrounding 
demand response programs, and in turn its effect on the 
generator side of the grid would largely comprise of a 
market model and a model for demand participation. Our 
modelling approach is to combine the features of an 
electricity market with the models of generators and 
demand that are actively participating in this market. The 
framework focuses on the operation of the short term 
electricity market prevalent in the UK. Price signals 
arising out of the short term market provide a useful 
indicator of the level of participation of generators and 
demand sites in balancing the power requirement of the 
system. Additionally, it could act as a basis for demand to 
respond to variations in the market. 
 
A. Market Model 
 
The main stay of the framework is an Agent-based Short 
Term Electricity Market (A-STEM) model that was 
developed as part of an EPSRC funded project 
CASCADE (Complex Adaptive Systems Cognitive 
Agent and Distributed Energy) [4]. In this model we 
represent a day-ahead power exchange employing a 
simple double discriminatory auction mechanism and a 
UK based balancing mechanism market that operates in 
real-time. The trading parties engage in the markets 
through bids and offers that are updated in real-time. 
These bidding strategies are largely based on the 
imbalance between supply and demand and also on the 
technical characteristics and economic models of the 
generating units.  
 
PowerExchange(Px)
SystemOperator
SettlementCompanyMessageBoardBalancingMechanismUnit (BMU)
Fig. 1. Schematic of the short term electricity market used in the 
framework. The arrows indicate the flow of information. 
 
While the power exchange operates without much 
supervision, the balancing mechanism is monitored and 
delivered by the system operator, which in the UK is the 
National Grid. The Balancing Mechanism Units (BMUs) 
are nothing but the generating units and the load entities 
that are parties in the trading. Figure 1 shows the 
different entities of the market model and interactions 
between them.  
 
These entities are modelled as agents behaving in a 
predefined manner but adaptable to the environment in 
which they are interacting. This approach allows the 
BMUs to alter their bidding strategies given the revenue 
that they earn over time. The system operator accepts and 
rejects bids based on reliability and cost-effectiveness. 
The system operator also has to make sure that the 
physical constraints of the grid are satisfied while 
accepting these bids. The bids and offers might be in the 
form of increase or decrease in either generation or 
demand. The settlement company then calculate the 
System Sell and System Buy Prices (SSP/SBP) which are 
forwarded on to those BMUs who are aggregate demand 
sites. The SBP and SSP are as shown in Figure 2. The 
prices are plotted over five days, each day being made up 
of 48 settlement periods. 
 
Fig. 2. A plot of the System Sell and System Buy Prices of the 
Balancing Market [4]. Each Settlement Period is of ½ hour 
duration. 
 
B. Generator and Aggregated Demand Models 
 
The framework consists of generators of different 
technologies such as Coal, CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine), offshore and onshore Wind turbines. The 
capacities for each of the generating plant are fixed based 
on the prevalent UK standard values taken from the 
National Grid’s database. For example the capacity of a 
coal plant is fixed at 1200MW with an operating load 
factor of 40%. Similarly, CCGT plants have a capacity of 
800MW with a load factor of 60%, whereas a typical 
wind farm is assumed to have a capacity of 150MW with 
a load factor of about 25%. The details of the generator 
characteristics are given in [4].  
 
The aim of the generating units is to minimize their 
operating costs, as given in equation (1), while increasing 
the profits through improvised bids and offers in the 
market.  
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(where, FC and VC are the fixed and variable costs of the  
i
th
 generators, Cap is the Capacity of the generators and 
G is the actual generation of the i
th
 unit in j
th
 hour.) As a 
result, the flexibility of the demand profile is crucial for 
generating units to develop strategies for participation in 
the market [3]. Such models have predominantly been 
based on optimization principles [5], [6]. However, such 
models suffer from not taking into account the adaptive 
dynamic behaviours of generating and demand units in a 
competitive market. They usually assume similar bidding 
strategies for all generators. Estimates of the various 
costs associated with the running of generating plants of 
specific types are given in Table I. 
 
TABLE I. – Estimates of Generation Costs, Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, UK 2012. 
Costs (£/MWh) CCGT Coal 
Onshore 
Wind 
Offshore 
Wind 
Capital 9 22 73 97 
Fixed O&M 3 5 17 37 
Variable O&M 0 1 3 - 
Fuel 48 28 - - 
Carbon costs 19 45 - - 
Total 80 102 93 134 
 
 
The demand is broadly classified into two groups, 
namely SMALL_DEM and LARGE_DEM sites of capacities 
200MW and 1000MW respectively. An estimation of the 
demand curve for each of these demand sites is done 
based on the national grid’s generic demand profile. An 
estimate of the daily total demand curve is as shown in 
Figure 3. The SMALL_DEM for example would be an 
AGGREGATOR of a community of households supplied by 
the same supplier. In such a case the aggregator is said to 
have commercially aggregated the loads. We consider 
three broad categories of aggregated demand profiles – 
residential, commercial and industrial. The values for 
elasticity (Table II) are average and are derived by 
aggregating over individual consumer units. This avoids 
the complexity of modelling consumers such as 
households. For testing the framework we consider 
elasticities of 10% and 30%. However the framework has 
the capability to run over a range of elasticities as given 
in Table II below. 
 
TABLE II. – Estimates of Electricity Price Elasticity based on 
Day-Ahead RTP [7], [8]. 
 Price Elasticity 
Residential -0.05 to -0.12 
Commercial -0.01 to -0.28 
Industrial -0.01 to -0.38 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The generators and demand sites as described above are 
allowed to participate in the A-STEM market model. The 
settlement period is used as the unit time step for all 
market operations. This period is equal to ½ hour in the 
present UK system, i.e., the billing, metering and 
balancing of power is done predominantly at ½ hour time 
intervals. The generators and demand aggregators bid 
into the market along with an estimate of their generating 
and demand profiles. The system operator then settles the 
market by accepting preferable bids and conveys this 
information to the trading parties who in turn make 
changes to their generation or demand accordingly. The 
sustainability of a particular power plant depends not 
only on its bids/offers being accepted but also on its 
operating cost as determined by the technology of 
generation. We calculate the cost of operating each of the 
generating plants and the revenue it makes through 
accepted bids/offers, based on which the bid/offer prices 
are altered. This in turn affects the System Sell and 
System Buy Prices.  
 
The demand aggregators would respond to real time price 
signals from the short term electricity market according 
to their respective price elasticities [9]. These price 
signals could either be the System Sell or System Buy 
Prices of the Balancing Mechanism market (Fig 2) or a 
combination thereof. The System Buy Price (SBP) is the 
price paid by the generator BMU if it generates less than 
what it bid, and paid by the demand BMU if it consumes 
more than what it offered. This is sufficient enough 
reason for choosing SBP as the price signal for which the 
aggregated demand BMU responds. This would 
encourage the demand BMUs to reduce their actual 
consumption and in turn reduce the imbalance between 
supply and demand.  
 
This change in the demand profiles proliferates into the 
total imbalance between supply and demand as seen by 
the market, which in turn influences the bidding 
strategies of the players in the market. The market 
players such as generating units would then alter their 
bids based on their previous bidding experience and a 
goal to minimize their operating costs. The consequence 
of the above processes would give rise to the right 
proportion of a mixture of generation technologies in a 
competitive electricity market based on the price 
elasticity of aggregated demand sites. 
 
An estimate of the aggregated demand is supplied by 
each demand BMU to the system operator who in turn 
evaluates the total imbalance of the system for the next 
day. Suppose that 
0D  is the baseline demand which is an 
estimate of the next-day demand. This estimate is largely 
based on the present day demand. Each demand BMU is 
now allowed to respond to a price signal P  which is 
supplied by the A-STEM model. This price signal is 
nothing but the SBP. This price signal is compared with 
the reference price signal
0P , which is an average of the 
SBPs taken over N number of days. Therefore the 
reference price for the i
th
 settlement period is 
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The new demand is given by  
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 settlement period of a 
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Each of the 5 LARGE_DEM and 3 SMALL_DEM sites 
respond to the price signal as given by equation (4). For 
example, each individual consumer unit is assumed to 
respond to the price signal and this response is 
aggregated at the level of a demand BMU such as a 
SMALL_DEM site. The new demand profile is therefore 
the aggregated responses of the individual units. 
 
4. Results 
 
Using the agent based modelling framework and the 
methodology as described in sections 2 and 3 
respectively, we investigate three scenarios relating to 
varying proportions of generation technology. The 
overall capacity of generation and demand remains the 
same across the three scenarios. In the first instance we 
consider 4 coal plants, 7 CCGT plants and only 3 wind 
farms. The training phase for building a reference price 
signal is 100 days, during which period the demand sites 
do not respond to the price signal. Once the reference 
price signal is built, all the 5 LARGE_DEM and 3 
SMALL_DEM sites are allowed to respond to the actual 
price signal which is the SBP of the previous day. We 
test the scenario with aggregated elasticity factors of 10% 
and 30% respectively. The price signals and the total 
aggregated demand curves are shown in Figure 3. We 
notice that as the actual price signal varies around the 
reference price, the demands respond appropriately, i.e., 
for increase in price from the reference, the demand 
reduces in volume. This reduction in demand is 
proportional to the elasticity. We also notice that the 
reference price is smoother for lesser proportion of wind 
farms. However the deviation of the actual price from the 
reference is substantial, thus making a good impact on 
the responsiveness of the demands. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Case A: Coal plants – 4, CCGT – 7, Wind farms – 3. 
Aggregate demand response curves for aggregated elasticities 
of 10% and 30% respectively. The reference price and the 
actual price signals are normalized between 0 and 1.  
 
In the second case, we increase the proportion of wind 
power keeping the total capacity constant. The generation 
mix now has 2 coal plants, 3 CCGT plants and 44 wind 
farms. We immediately notice a substantial change in the 
reference price which is the average SBP over 100 days. 
Additionally, the actual price is closely following the 
volatile reference price, thereby not allowing for much 
response from demand aggregators. Only when the 
elasticity is increased to 30% do we see any noticable 
change in the total demand. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Case B: Coal plants – 2, CCGT – 3, Wind farms – 44. 
Aggregate demand response curves for aggregated elasticities 
of 10% and 30% respectively. The reference price and the 
actual price signals are normalized between 0 and 1.  
 
Finally, we increase the proportion of wind farms to 64, 
while number of coal and CCGT plants are reduced to 1 
and 2 respectively. With such a high proportion of  
intermittent source, we once again notice the volatility in 
the reference price and the respective demand response. 
These plots show that demand response varies in 
accordance to the proportion of different technology mix 
even when the total generating capacity remains the 
same. Therefore such an agent based framework provides 
a good basis for testing the evolution of a right proportion 
of genertion mix for demand response programs to work 
effectively. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Case C: Coal plants – 1, CCGT – 2, Wind farms – 64. 
Aggregate demand response curves for aggregated elasticities 
of 10% and 30% respectively. The reference price and the 
actual price signals are normalized between 0 and 1.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the present work we have described an agent-based 
framework of the UK short term electricity market along 
with models for generation and aggregated demand sites. 
These demand sites are allowed to be elastic in response 
to price signals from the market. Similarly, the generators 
are allowed to alter their bids and offers in a dynamic 
market environment. The change in the demand is 
influenced by its response to system buy price that is a 
direct consequence of the bids and offers of the 
generating demand units. The bidding strategies 
employed by the generators are guided by the operating 
cost of the generation technology employed. Thus a 
feedback loop is formed between the demand and the 
profitability of the generators resulting in some 
generation technologies prevailing over the others in the 
longer term. In the present work, we investigate three 
such scenarios where the mix of generation technology is 
varied in different proportions resulting in variations in 
SBPs and consequently variations in the response of 
aggregated demand sites. From the plots in figures 3 to 5 
we notice that a higher percentage of wind powered 
generation results not only in volatile prices but less than 
expected response from elastic loads. This is mainly due 
to the fact that the actual price signal closely follows the 
reference price signal for higher percentage of wind 
power. Using the above framework we can therefore 
assess the effect of varying proportions of generation 
technology mix on the response of demand aggregators 
through price signals from the market. This would give 
us an idea of the right proportion of technology mix for 
sustaining a required amount of demand response, 
thereby allowing the generators to put faith in the bidding 
curves that they submit in the market. In the model we 
take into account generator characteristics such as 
generating profiles, market behaviour and cost of 
generation of individual technologies, while on the 
demand side, the emphasis is on aggregated demand 
profiles and price elasticity within a particular range.  
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